bevisningen om tysk sejr gradvis måtte svækkes for til slut at ende med vished om nederlaget.

Det jeg imidlertid særligt tænker på, er den samtale vi havde i mit kontor på Instituttet, og hvor jeg på grund af det emne, du bragte op, nøje indprentede mig hvert ord der faldt. Det måtte jo gøre et meget stærkt indtryk på mig, at du straks til at begynde med udtalte, at du følte dig sikker på, at krigen, hvis den varede tilstrækkeligt længe, ville blive afgjort ved atomvåben. Jeg havde jo på det tidspunkt intet som helst kendskab til de forberedelser, der var i gang i England og Amerika. Du tilføjede, da jeg måske så tvivlende ud, at jeg måtte forstå, at du i de sidste år næsten udelukkende havde beskæftiget dig med dette spørgsmål og ikke tvivlede på, at det kunne lade sig gøre. Det er mig derfor ganske ubegribeligt, at du skulle mene at have antydet for mig, at de tyske fysikere ville gøre hvad de kunne for at hindre en sådan udnyttelse af atomvidenskaben. Under samtalen, der jo kun blev meget kort, var jeg naturligvis meget tilbageholdende, men tænkte ikke desto mindre meget over dens indhold, og min forskrækkelse blev jo ikke mindre ved at høre fra de andre på Instituttet, at Weizsäcker havde udtalt, hvor lykkeligt det ville være for videnskabens stilling i Tyskland efter sejren, at du kunne hjælpe så væsentligt dertil.

I dit brev til Jungk kommer du også ind på Jensens besøg i København i 1943 under hans rejser til Norge for at medvirke ved bestræbelserne på at forøge produktionen af tungt vand. Det er rigtigt, at Jensen over for os understregede, at dette arbejde kun tog sigte på energifrembringelse til industrielle formål, men selv om vi var tilbøjelige til at nære tillid til hans oprigtighed, følte vi os på ingen måde sikre på, hvor meget han selv vidste om hele arbejdet i Tyskland.

viction of a German victory and confidence in what it would bring. Naturally, we understand that it may be difficult for you to keep track of how you thought and expressed yourselves at the various stages of the war, the course of which changed as time passed so that the conviction of German victory gradually had to weaken and finally end with the certainty of defeat.

However, what I am thinking of in particular is the conversation we had in my office at the Institute, during which, because of the subject you raised, I carefully fixed in my mind every word that was uttered. It had to make a very strong impression on me that at the very outset you stated that you felt certain that the war, if it lasted sufficiently long, would be decided with atomic weapons. I had at that time no knowledge at all of the preparations that were under way in England and America. You added, when I perhaps looked doubtful, that I had to understand that in recent years you had occupied yourself almost exclusively with this question and did not doubt that it could be done. It is therefore quite incomprehensible to me that you should think that you hinted to me that the German physicists would do all they could to prevent such an application of atomic science. During the conversation, which was only very brief, I was naturally very cautious but nevertheless thought a lot about its content, and my alarm was not lessened by hearing from the others at the Institute that Weizsäcker had stated how fortunate it would be for the position of science in Germany after the victory that you could help so significantly towards this end.

In your letter to Jungk you also mention Jensen’s visits to Copenhagen in 1943 during his journeys to Norway to participate in the efforts to increase the production of heavy water. It is true that Jensen emphasized to us that this work was only aimed at the production of energy for industrial purposes, but although we were inclined to trust his sincerity, we felt in no way certain regarding how much he himself knew about the whole effort in Germany.